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Abstract
The increase in availability and reduction in cost of commercial communication de-
vices (e.g. IEEE compliant such as 802.11, WiFi, 802.16, Blutooth etc.) has increased
wireless user exposure and the need for techniques to properly identify/classify signals
for increased security measures. Communication device emissions include intentional
modulation that enables correct device operation. Hardware and environmental fac-
tors alter the ideal response and induce unintentional modulation effects. If these
effects (features) are sufficiently unique, it becomes possible to identify a device us-
ing its fingerprint, with potential discrimination of not only the manufacturer but
possibly the serial number for a given manufacturer.
Many techniques in many domains have been investigated to extract features,
identify a fingerprint, classify signals, and each technique has certain benefits and
limitations. Previous AFIT research has demonstrated the effectiveness of RF Fin-
gerprinting using 802.11A signals with 1) spectral correlation on Power Spectral
Density (PSD) fingerprints, 2) Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classification with fingerprints obtained from Time Domain (TD) and
Wavelet Domain (WD) statistical features. Performance “gain”, defined as the differ-
ence in Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) required to achieve comparable classification per-
formance, has been used to demonstrate considerable improvement. Spectral Domain
(SD) fingerprinting uses PSD features for device discrimination. Results presented
here show some improvement over the WD approach (gain ≈ 3 dB) and significant
improvement over the TD approach (gain ≈ 8 dB).
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Spectral Domain RF Fingerprinting
for 802.11 Wireless Devices
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The increase in availability and reduction in cost of commercial communication
devices (e.g. IEEE compliant such as 802.11, WiFi, 802.16, Blutooth etc.) has
increased wireless user exposure and the need for techniques to properly identify/-
classify signals for increased security. Communication device emissions include inten-
tional modulation that enables correct device operation. This intentional modulation
may be remotely intercepted, where the interceptor may be passive (listen, monitor,
record, analyze, etc.) or become active such as “spoofing” or even inject traffic into
the system.
A great deal of research has focused on traditional bit-level algorithmic approaches
to mitigate spoofing and improve network security [8]. More recent research has
been accomplished to detect and mitigate spoofing within or near the lower levels
of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) architecture. One work suggests using
a “lightweight security layer” within the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer for
anomalous traffic and spoofing detection [8].
The goal of other recent work tries to exploit Radio Frequency (RF) characteristics
at the Physical (PHY) layer that are difficult to mimic, thus minimizing spoofing
opportunities [13]. The fundamental research goal in [15, 16, 17] involved developing
RF fingerprinting techniques to obtain a Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) similar
1
to that used to distinguish radar emitters [9].
Spanning nearly twenty years, radar SEI uses parameters based on intentional
modulation applied within a given pulse (intra-pulse modulation) or applied across
multiple pulses (inter-pulse modulation). Hardware and environmental factors such
as poor system design, improper operation, and physical device limitation alter the
ideal signal response and induce unintentional modulation effects. At the waveform
level, these unintentional modulation effects are similar to what occur in existing
wireless communication systems that transmit burst-like waveforms representing dig-
ital information such as symbols, bits, or packets. If the unintentional modulation
effects (features) are sufficiently unique it becomes possible to identify a given device
using its fingerprint, with potential discrimination of not only the manufacturer but
also serial number for a given manufacturer.
1.2 Problem Statement
The RF fingerprinting process is separated into four phases, including: 1) burst
detection, 2) signal region of interest selection and feature extraction, 3) fingerprint
generation, and 4) fingerprint classification of unknown received signals. These phases
are the basis for many fingerprinting techniques, with each focusing on different signal
features in different domains: Wavelet Domain (WD), Time Domain (TD) and/or
Spectral Domain (SD).
Many techniques in many domains have been investigated to extract features,
identify a fingerprint, classify signals, and each has certain benefits and limitations.
This research uses the TD and WD process developed in previous research to cor-
rectly classify emissions from Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
802.11A signals using SD features. The process is then applied to a Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) 802.11B signal.
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1.3 Related Research
This research builds on accomplishments from three previous works [1, 5, 15].
The work in [15] focused on detection and identification of GMRS/FRS press-to-talk
radios and 802.11A network device RF transmission. The features included instan-
taneous amplitude, instantaneous phase, and instantaneous frequency. These were
used to calculate statistics for feature characterization to identify unique fingerprints.
Two methods of classification were used for 802.11A devices: spectral-based corre-
lation which produced classification accuracies up to 74% for SNR = -3 to 6 dB ,
and Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)-based classi-
fication which produced classification accuracies of 74% to 90% for the same values
of SNRs.
The work in [5] explored burst detection techniques to identify the feasibility and
repeatability of detecting and locating the start of a waveform burst. Two techniques
were utilized: Fractal Baysian Step Change Detector (Fractal-BSCD) and Traditional
Variance Trajectory (VT). A newly developed WD fingerprinting technique provided
improved performance over previous TD techniques [15, 16, 17], with 2-7 dB of gain
improvement realized at 80% classification.
The work in [1] proposed a new transient-based identification method for DSSS
802.15 CC2420 wireless sensor nodes and explored various transformation methods
for input data into a Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) feature extractor. The
transformation that yielded the highest recognition accuracy was based on the relative
difference between adjacent Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) spectra. The so called
Prop method produced recognition results with an Equal Error Rate (EER) as low
as 0.24%.
As described in greater detail throughout this document, this research focuses on
SD fingerprinting using Power Spectral Density (PSD) fingerprinting features gener-
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ated from common statistics (variance, skewness, and kurtosis) to formulate unique
fingerprints for signal classification.
1.4 Resources
AFIT provided a number of tools used throughout this research. All signal data
were collected using the Agilentr-based RF Signal Intercept and Collection Sys-
tem (RFSICS). The RFSICS consists of the following pieces of equipment: Agilentr
E3238s system hardware and an HP Compaq nc8430 laptop computer equipped with
the Agilentr E3238s and Vector Signal Analyzer (VSA) software tools. Two Dell
laptops were used and equipped with 802.11 wireless cards specified in Table 1.1. All
post-processing was accomplished using MATLABr version 7.7.0 (R2008b).
Table 1.1. Device manufacturer, serial number, and signal type (802.11A and 802.11B)
used for generating Chapter 4 results.
Manu Serial Number / Signal Type
Cisco N4U9 / A&B N4UD / A&B N4UW / A&B N4PX / A&B
Linksys 0306 / B 0307 / B 361 / B
Netgear 0209 / B 0217 / B 273 / B
1.5 Thesis Organization
Chapter II provides background information on RF DNA fingerprinting, Fisher
Linear Discriminant (FLD), Spectral Correlation, Baysian Decision Theory, and MDA/ML
classification. Chapter III describes the research methodology and overall process for
signal collection, post-collection processing, digital filtering, region of interest selec-
tion, SD signal transformation and fingerprint feature generation for MDA/ML classi-
fication. Chapter IV presents results obtained from the process discussed in Chapter
III for the signals of interest. Chapter V provides conclusions based on results in
Chapter IV and suggest areas for further investigation and research. Appendix A
4
provides a detailed process for RFSICS signal collection as used to obtain all data for
this research.
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II. Background
2.1 Overview
The material presented in this chapter lays the ground work for the methodology
described in Chapter III along with the results presented in Chapter IV. Section 2.2
provides an introduction to RF fingerprinting. Section 2.3 discusses Power Spectral
Density (PSD)-based fingerprinting, Section 2.4 discusses Bayes Decision Theory ap-
plied to classification, Section 2.5 discusses the feature statistics used to create the
statistical fingerprints used for classification, and Section 2.6 provides insight into
the Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) classification
method used for generating classification results described in Chapter IV.
2.2 RF Fingerprinting
RF Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) fingerprinting is the process used to iden-
tify and classify unique radio transmission characteristics from a device of interest.
RF fingerprint classification embodies four phases which include: burst detection,
waveform feature generation (amplitude, phase, frequency, PSD), fingerprint extrac-
tion, and device classification. Feature extraction determines which domain (time,
frequency, or spectral) yields specific signal information (features). Transient start
detection is needed to determine where the signal starts for Region of Interest (ROI)
selection.
Once the feature and ROI have been selected, statistics (mean, variance, skewness,
kurtosis) can be calculated and extracted to determine the unique signal fingerprint.
Fingerprint classification determines how well the fingerprint of one device can be
identified or differentiated from another device.
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2.3 PSD-based Fingerprinting
The PSD describes the distribution of signal power in the frequency domain [14],
which is important because it identifies the frequency components having strong or
weak variation. Since frequency is derived from a transformation of time responses,
frequency domain variation provides alternative time domain processing. Previous
work [15, 16, 17] used PSD fingerprints along with spectral correlation for device
classification. The process involved generating reference PSD fingerprints {Φm,r(k)}
for each class m ∈ M :
Φm,r(k) =
1
NT
NT∑
i=1
Φi(k), (1)
where NT is the number of collected training signals and Φi(k) is the un-normalized
PSD sequence of the ith collection from class m [15]. To eliminate any power bias
present from the signal collection process, each reference PSD fingerprint is normalized
to unit power.
Classification was accomplished by cross-correlating each PSD with the average
reference fingerprint from each class [15, 16, 17]. At a Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
approaching 6 dB, classification accuracies of 74% were achieved using this PSD-based
spectral-correlation classification process [15, 16, 17].
Additional spectral-based work in [1] used FFT-based Fisher-features to finger-
print 802.15.4 CC2420 DSSS devices. Several transformation variants were investi-
gated for recognition, and the so-called Prop method (difference between adjacent
FFT spectra) yielded the highest recognition accuracy.
The feature extraction process in [1] involved extracting the transient part of the
signal, where the amplitude of the signal l at time t is f(t, l). Once the transient part
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of the signal was extracted, a one-dimensional Fourier transform was calculated:
F (ω, l) =
1√
M
M−1∑
m=0
f(t, l)exp(−2πi tω
M
), (2)
where 0 ≤ t ≤ M − 1 and M is the number of samples in the transient part of the
signal. For the Prop method, the relative difference between adjacent FFT spectra
in (2) was calculated using
−→sl =
[|F (2, l)| − |F (1, l)|, |F (3, l)| − |F (2, l)|, · · ·, |F (M
2
− 1, l)| − |F (M
2
− 2, l)|] (3)
with the DC component and the redundant half of the spectrum removed [1]. The
Fisher-feature is a projection vector −→gl extracted from the Fourier spectrum using
the LDA matrix WL, where
−→gl = W tL−→sl . (4)
The Fisher-feature G for a given device of N captured signals is an array of gl elements
from (4) defined as
G = W tLS, (5)
where S is a matrix such that S = [s0..s1..sN ] (4). Finally, a feature template h is
used for recognition calculated from the mean vector and covariance matrix of G.
Using this process [1] reported results of EER 0.24%, meaning that the recognition
system correctly identifies a sensor node with 99.5% accuracy.
2.4 Bayesian Decision Theory
The classification method of Bayesian decision theory [2] takes d -dimensional data
belonging to one of c classes of data based on probability densities, prior probabilities,
and any costs associated with making a classification decision [2]. Decision boundaries
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are defined within the feature space that reduce the probability of misclassification
of the input data from the c classes of data. The Gaussian density function is used
as the probability model for Bayesian classification given by
p(y) =
1√
2πσ
exp
[
−1
2
(
y − µ
σ
)2]
, (6)
where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean.
To minimize probability of misclassification, decision boundaries are formed using
(6) as the distribution model for the vectors in the feature space. According to Bayes’
rule, the posterior probability P (ωj|y) is given by a set of c total classes,{ω1, ..., ωc},
and a d -dimensional feature vector y yield the equation
P (ωj|y) = p(y|ωjP (ωj)
p(y)
, (7)
where class ωj contain the feature vector, and
p(y) =
c∑
j=1
p(y)P (ωj) (8)
contains the conditional probability p(y|ωj) and prior probability P (ωj). A decision
rule is a goal that lessens the risk associated with making a decision. Assuming that
action αi is taken based on the occurrence of of y from ωj, the conditional risk is
R(αi|y) =
c∑
j=1
λijP (ωj)∀i = 1, ..., a, (9)
where a is the number of possible action and the cost of choosing ωi when ωj occurred
is λij. The Bayes decision rule chooses the ωj that minimizes R(αi|y) for all actions
a. To minimize the probability of misclassification and divide the feature space into
c regions, y is assigned to the class with the minimum R(αi|y), thus reducing the
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decision rule to [2]
(λjk − λkk)p(y|ωk)P (ωk) ≷ωjωk (λkj − λjj)p(y|ωj)P (ωj), ∀j 6= k. (10)
Assuming uniform costs and equal prior probabilities, (P (ωj) = P (ωk),∀j 6= k), (10)
the result is
p(y|ωk) ≷ωjωk p(y|ωj),∀j 6= k. (11)
A point belonging to ωj assigned to ωk registers as a misclassification. The total
probability of making a classification error is
PE =
∑
j,k
j 6=k
= P [Classify as ωj|ωk is true] . (12)
The univariate Gaussian distribution presented in (6) is insufficient for multi-class
analysis. The multivariate model used for two classes in d -dimensions given by
p(y) =
1
(2π)
d
2 |∑ | 12
exp
[
−1
2
(y− µ)t
−1∑
(y− µ)
]
, (13)
where µ is the d -component mean vector, y is a d -component column vector, and
∑
is the d× d covariance matrix
∑
= E
[
(y− µ)t(y− µ)] . (14)
Here the E[·] notation represents the statistical expected value or sample mean. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows projected probability densities of the multivariate Gaussian model for
a c = 3 class problem with d = 2 dimensional feature space. As shown projected
onto the lower plane, the decision boundaries are used to calculate the total analytic
probability of classification error.
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Figure 2.1. Example of the Multivariate Gaussian Model for a c=3 class problem and
a d=2 dimensional feature space, where decision boundaries are shown projected onto
lower plane.
2.5 Feature Statistics
Using the entire signal characteristic (feature) for the fingerprint, as described in
Section 2.3, may be unrealistic if computational processing time or data storage is
limited. Previous work [5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17] made use of statistical behavior
inherent in signal characteristics to reduce the dimensionality of the fingerprints. To
coincide with previous work in [5, 6, 7], the statistics of variance (σ2), skewness (γ),
and kurtosis (κ) are used here to create statistical fingerprints for classification. These
11
statistics are obtained as follows:
σ2x =
1
Nx
Nx∑
k=1
[x(k)− x̄]2 , (15)
γx =
1
Nx
Nx∑
k=1
[x(k)− x̄]3
{
1
Nx
Nx∑
k=1
[x(k)− x̄]2
}3/2 , (16)
κx =
1
Nx
Nx∑
k=1
[x(k)− x̄]4
{
1
Nx
Nx∑
k=1
[x(k)− x̄]2
}2 , (17)
where x is the sample mean of an arbitrary sequence {x(k)} and k = 1, 2, ..., Nx. The
final RF statistical fingerprints were obtained in previous work [5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16,
17] by calculating these statistics from various signal characteristics (instantaneous
amplitude, instantaneous phase, and or instantaneous frequency). For work presented
here, the PSD statistics are used to form spectral-based fingerprints.
2.6 MDA/ML Classification
While there are many methods for classification, they all fundamentally involve
using a subset of the input data to train the classifier and the remaining data for
classification itself. Attempting to classify higher-dimensional data becomes difficult
without the use of the Fisher Linear Discriminant (FLD), which projects higher-
dimensional input data into a lower dimensional space while producing maximum
separation between the classes [2].
Although FLD can be applied to any number of inputs, MDA/ML is an extension
of FLD for three classes of input data [2, 3]. Discriminating between c classes of
input data containing d -dimensions, linearly projecting the input vector x onto a
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(d -1)-dimensional space can be obtained through
y = WTx , (18)
where the vector of projected values y corresponds to the input vector x and the
transformation matrix W has dimensionality d × (c - 1) [2]. Classification is accom-
plished using ML distributions to calculate 2-dimensional decision boundaries used
on unknown input data. Figure 2.2 pictorially represents the MDA/ML training
and classification process, where the decision boundaries are calculated from the ML
distributions (top) and the projected data is used for classification (bottom).
13
Figure 2.2. MDA/ML Training (top) and Classification (bottom) [5].
14
III. Methodology
3.1 Overview
This chapter describes signal detection and classification process used for this re-
search. The process here is consistent with previous work [5, 6, 7] and is illustrated in
Figure 3.1 [5, 6, 7]. Section 3.2 provides details for the Signal Collection process using
AFIT’s RF Signal Intercept and Collection System (RFSICS). Section 3.3 describes
post-processing collection procedures, which include down-conversion, filtering, burst
sorting, and analysis signal generation. Section 3.4 describes the process for RF
statistical fingerprint generation, which includes PSD calculation, region of interest
selection, and statistical feature calculation. Section 3.5 discusses the MDA/ML sig-
nal classification process which was used to generate all classification results presented
in Chapter 4.
Figure 3.1. Process used for signal collection, detection, analysis signal generation, and
classification of 802.11 signals [5, 6, 7].
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3.2 Signal Collection
All data used for this research was collected in accordance with the RFSICS
collection process outlined in Appendix A. Prior to making collections, two separate
laptops were configured as a peer-to-peer network using 802.11 wireless cards. The
cards were powered up, set to the appropriate operating mode (802.11A or 802.11B),
and information is transferred from one to the other while the RFSICS is operating
in collection mode.
The signal-of-interest (SOI) center frequency is located using a wide band search
spanning 20.0 MHz and 6.0 GHz. After the SOI is located, the 36 MHz RFSICS front-
end filter is tuned and centered on the dominant spectral response. To maximize the
collected signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and to reduce amplitude clipping, the RFSICS
Analog-to-digital (ADC) dynamic range is set manually. The signal is then down-
converted by the RFSICS, sampled by a 12-bit ADC, and stored as complex I-Q
data.
The data is stored using an Agilentr proprietary “capture” (*.cap) format and
subsequently converted to a MATLABr (*.mat) format for post-collection process-
ing. This research only used the real component of collected signals. Representative
collected burst responses from 802.11A/B devices are shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2. Representative magnitude responses for bursts collected from 802.11A
(top) and 802.11B (bottom) devices.
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3.3 Post-Collection Processing
The MATLABr (*.mat) formatted data is a vector of sampled data for each
burst. Pulse detection and sorting makes it possible for each burst to be examined
separately. Each burst is extracted and stacked separately into one row of a given
matrix for easy access and examination. Each collected burst response is baseband
filtered using a 6th order Butterworth filter having a baseband bandwidth of BW =
7.7 MHz. Previous work [5, 6, 7] showed that BW = 7.7 MHz provides maximum
classification performance when using the 802.11A preamble as the region of interest
(ROI). After filtering, the preamble region is extracted and stored in a new matrix
for subsequent fingerprint generation.
3.3.1 Pulse Detection and Sorting.
Collections of 802.11 data are initially in vector form, where each burst is extracted
and placed into row matrix form. A pulse detection algorithm is used with adjustable
characteristics (desired detection threshold, minimum/maximum length, number of
bursts, smoothing factor) to extract and sort each burst and placed into a matrix.
These adjustable characteristics are used since not all bursts in the collection fit the
criteria (minimum/maximum length). The algorithm first smooths (averages) over a
given number of samples, specified as the smoothing factor. It then detects a burst at
the desired detection threshold value (tD = -3 dB) and locates this point at both ends
of the burst. Finally, it checks to see if the burst is wider than the minimum value
but narrower than the maximum value. This process produces a matrix where all
undesirable bursts have been removed, leaving bursts meeting the criteria for further
post-processing. Figure 3.3 illustrates the process over a small region of the original
802.11B collected data.
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Figure 3.3. Representation of the burst extraction process, where a burst having insuf-
ficient width is rejected and bursts meeting pulse width criteria are placed in a matrix
for post collection processing.
3.3.2 Preamble Region Extraction and Filtering.
According to 802.11A signal specifications, the preamble region contains informa-
tion at the beginning of each burst to aid in diversity selection, timing/frequency
acquisition, and channel estimation [4]. Figure 3.4 shows the preamble region of the
802.11A signal.
19
Figure 3.4. Representation 802.11A signal with preamble region highlighted (left) with
structure (right).
3.4 Statistical Fingerprint Generation
Once the signal preamble region is filtered and extracted, the bursts are used
to calculate statistical RF fingerprints that are input to the MDA/ML classification
process. The PSD feature is first calculated and normalized according to (21). The
DC component and redundant half of the data are removed. Regional variation
analysis is then used to determine a specific number of regions (NR) for subdividing
the PSD feature. Consistent with previous work, the statistics of interest here include
variance, skewness, and kurtosis. These features are calculated over each PSD region
that makes up a fingerprint matrix which is input to the MDA/ML classification
process.
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3.4.1 Power Spectral Density (PSD) Calculation.
The PSD is obtained through the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a complex
sequence {x(n)},
X(k) =
1
Nx
Nx∑
n=1
x(n)exp
[
−j( 2π
Nx
)(n− 1)(k − 1)
]
(19)
where n = 1, 2, ..., Nx [10]. To reduce potential amplitude bias from the collection
process, the normalized PSD is calculated. First, the total average power is calculated
using
Xp =
1
Nx
Nx∑
k=1
x(k)x∗(k), (20)
where ∗ denotes complex conjugate and Nx is the total number of samples. The
expression in (20) along with the PSD expression in (19) is used to form the normalized
PSD given by
φx(k) =
1
Xp
|X(k)|2 = 1
Xp
{Re2 [X(k)] + Im2 [X(k)]}. (21)
The DC component (k = 0) is removed, and the redundant half discarded (k =
1, 2, ..., Nx
2
) to form statistical fingerprints. Figure 3.5 shows the calculated normalized
PSD (Figure 3.5(a)) for an 802.11A signal from Figure 3.2 using (21) along with the
portion (Figure 3.5(b)) used for fingerprint generation (DC component and redundant
half removed, highlighted in Figure 3.5(a)).
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Figure 3.5. Representative PSD responses (a) and portion (highlighted) used for fin-
gerprint generation with redundant half removed (b).
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3.4.2 Region Selection and Feature Calculation.
Region selection is based on analyzing the output of the classification process
with the collected SNR = 40 dB and NR varied from 3 to 21. Figure 3.7 shows
classification performance for NR variation at 40 dB. These results indicate that NR
= 13 is optimal and thus NR = 13 was used for all 802.11A results presented in Chapter
4. The selected value NR = 13 is used to subdivide (Figure 3.7) the preamble PSD
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Figure 3.6. Classification performance versus number of regions (NR) for SNR = 40
dB with NR = 13 selected and used for all 802.11A results.
into 12 subregions which are then used to calculate the statistics for each region. The
statistics for the entire preamble PSD are also calculated and appended at the end
of the matrix to form an NR = 13 regions with 12 subregions. For consistency with
previous research on 802.11A data [5, 6, 7], the statistics of variance (σ2), skewness
(γ), and kurtosis (κ) are calculated over each region to form the statistical fingerprint
as illustrated in (22). This process is repeated for each burst, then placed into a
fingerprint matrix that is input into the classification process. Using the expression
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in (22) with NR = 13 regions, the fingerprint matrix
FRi =
[
σ2i γi κi
]
i=1...NR
⇒ [FR1FR2 ...FRi ] (22)
that is input to the Fisher Training Process represents 39-dimensional data (1 PSD
Feature × 13 Regions × 3 Statistics).
Figure 3.7. Subdivision of PSD in Figure 3.5 into NR = 13 total regions for feature
calculation.
3.5 Signal Classification
The 39-dimensional fingerprint data obtained from Section 3.4.2 is input to the
MDA/ML training and classification process. The input data is calculated for three
different classes, where each class represents bursts from a specific 802.11 device.
Following the training process, signal classification is implemented as described in
Section 3.3. Monte Carlo simulation (noise generation, scaling and addition) and
K-fold cross validation are used in the MDA/ML signal classification process. Monte
Carlo simulation ensures statistical significance of data by running the event multiple
24
times, while K-fold cross validation randomly partitions the original data into K
blocks with K-1 blocks used for MDA/ML training and the remaining block used
for ML classification. The overall process for MDA/ML training and classification is
shown in Figure 3.8 [18].
Figure 3.8. MDA/ML classification process with K-fold cross validation [18].
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Overview
This chapter provides results and analysis of classification performance for 802.11A/B
signals based on processes outlined in Chapter 3. This research follows previous work
[5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 17, 16, 15] for OFDM 802.11A signals using a PSD-based transfor-
mation. The process for 802.11A signals is repeated for DSSS 802.11B signals to see
how well other signals can be identified and classified. This chapter includes a section
for 802.11A SD performance results and comparison with WD and TD taken from
[5, 6, 7], a section for 802.11B SD performance results including the Prop method
discussed in [1], and finally a section for comparing 802.11A results with those of
802.11B.
4.2 SD Performance: 802.11A signals
Intra-manufacturer discrimination follows previous research [5, 6, 7] using four
Cisco devices transmitting 802.11A signals, where the permutations are shown in Ta-
ble 4.1. These are like-mode devices from the same manufacturer (Cisco) and only
differ in serial number. It is assumed that they have been manufactured under iden-
tical environmental conditions, from identical lots, using identical components, with
identical processes. Intra-manufacturer classification is generally the most difficult (as
compared with inter-manufacturer) due to the devices having similar physical prop-
erties, varying slightly due to the make of the device (serial number discrimination).
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Table 4.1. 802.11A Cisco intra-manufacturer permutations [5, 6, 7].
Serial Number
Perm N4U9 N4UD N4UW N4PX
1 × × ×
2 × × ×
3 × × ×
4 × × ×
According to results in [5, 6, 7], Permutation #1 presented the “most stressing”
condition for classification and yielded poorest performance for all SNR = -3 to 40 dB.
Figure 4.1 results are taken directly from [5, 6, 7] and illustrate intra-manufacturer
classification accuracy for all four permutations in Table 4.1 using previous TD and
WD fingerprinting techniques. As shown, Perm #1 reflects the poorest performance
for both techniques. Considering permutation averages, WD provides approximately
6 dB of “gain” at 80% classification accuracy.
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Figure 4.1. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using TD and WD finger-
prints: All Permutations for Cisco devices transmitting 802.11A signals. Figure and
results taken directly from [5, 6, 7].
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Figure 4.2 shows new SD classification results for all four Cisco permutations in
Table 4.1. The mean across all permutations is shown with filled markers. These
results demonstrate that Permutation #1 and Permutation #3, both of which con-
tain serial numbers N4UD and N4UW, present the most stressing cases of the four
permutations. As with previous TD and WD results in [5, 6, 7], Perm #1 is again
the “most stressing” case for most SNRs considered.
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Figure 4.2. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingereprints: All
Permutations for Cisco devices transmitting 802.11A signals.
Table 4.2 provides classification confusion matrices for Perm #1 of the Cisco
devices for signals at SNR = 14 dB. Results for TD and WD are taken directly
from [5, 6, 7] and provided for comparison. Classification accuracies for a specific
class (device) are presented along the diagonal. The lower two matrices demonstrate
performance differences between SD and TD/WD, respectively. SD provides improved
performance over TD across all three devices, with greatest improvement of 28.5%
28
achieved for correctly classifying Class A. SD provides some improvement over WD
for correctly classifying Class A (8.4%) and Class C (0.8%), and some degradation in
classifying Class B.
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Table 4.2. Intra-manufacturer confusion matrices for SD, TD and WD fingerprinting:
Permutation #1 from Table 4.1 with 802.11A signals at SNR = 14 dB. (TD and WD
results from [5, 6, 7]).
SD Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 77.9% 5.2% 16.9%
B 6.0% 93.9% 0.1%
C 21.7% 0.3% 78.0%
TD Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 49.4% 17.3% 33.3%
B 18.5% 65.9% 15.6%
C 34.2% 12.1% 53.6%
WD Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 69.5% 5.9% 24.5%
B 5.3% 94.0% 0.7%
C 21.5% 1.3% 77.2%
SD - TD Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 28.5% -12.1% -16.4%
B -12.5% 28.0% -15.5%
C -12.5% -11.8% 24.4%
SD - WD Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 8.4% -0.7% -7.6%
B -0.7% -0.1% -0.6%
C 0.2% -1.0% 0.8%
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Figure 4.3 shows average classification results across all four permutations for the
three fingerprint generation methods WD, TD and SD, as taken from Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.2. At 80% classification accuracy, SD outperforms TD and provides a gain
of approximately 8 dB. While the SD performance is generally consistent with WD
performance, there is some statistical improvement (1%-3%) for SNR = -3 to 25 dB.
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Figure 4.3. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification: Average performance across
all four permutations of four Cisco devices transmitting 802.11A signals. TD and WD
results from 4.1 and SD results from 4.2.
In operational situations where equipment may not be co-located, or operates in
dissimilar environments (such as laboratory equipment) or when aligned at the 3db
point of the collected signal, the collected signals and burst start location can be
affected. This effect is referred to here as timing “jitter”. When the collected signals
are aligned “perfectly”, or at the approximate identical sample number, the effect is
referred to as “perfect”. The “jitter” effect on classification performance is illustrated
in Figure 4.4, where the signals were detected using a tD = -3 dB threshold.
The “jitter” effect can be seen in Figure 4.5, which overlays the “perfect” align-
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Figure 4.4. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification: “Jittered” Classification Per-
formance using all Permutations for Cisco devices transmitting 802.11A signals.
ment with that of the “jittered” collections. As can be seen, the effect at higher
SNR values is more susceptibility to jitter than the lower SNR values, where the “jit-
tered” results show minimal degradation. Intra-manufacturer classification results for
all three fingerprinting methods (TD, WD, and SD) for observed burst location error
“jitter” using Perm #2 from Table 4.1 are shown in Figure 4.6, where performance for
TD and WD were taken directly from [5, 6, 7]. Results in Figure 4.6 also demonstrate
SD performance improvement over TD and further show that SD is less susceptible
to ”jitter”. The results reflect that the TD technique is susceptible to phase shift
while the WD and SD are not.
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Figure 4.5. Average MDA/ML Classification accuracy for 802.11A intra-manufacturer
discrimination using average “perfect” results from Figure 4.2and average “jittered”
results from Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.6. Average MDA/ML Classification: Comparison of “perfect” and “jittered”
802.11A intra-manufacturer discrimination using observed burst location error statis-
tics. TD and WD results taken directly from [5, 6, 7].
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4.3 SD Performance: 802.11B signals
This section is divided into two subsections and presents results on intra/inter-
manufacturer performance using devices transmitting 802.11B signals. Intra-manufacturer
discrimination follows Section 4.2 with devices transmitting 802.11B signals for all
permutations and worst case Perm #1 shown in Table 4.1. To investigate and com-
pare intra-manufacturer performance between manufacturer, three devices from each
Linksys and Netgear were used as well as the three Cisco devices to see how well
serial number discrimination can be performed using the SD fingerprint method. Ta-
ble 4.3 shows all devices (used for 802.11B inter-manufacturer discrimination where
the permutations are shown with the “×”s in the table).
Table 4.3. 802.11B inter-manufacturer permutations.
Serial Number
Manufacturer Cisco Linksys Netgear
Perm N4U9 N4UD N4UW 306 307 361 209 217 273
1 × × ×
2 × × ×
3 × × ×
4.3.1 802.11B Intra-Manufacturer Performance.
Intra-manufacturer discrimination was performed using devices transmitting 802.11B
signals for all four Cisco devices shown in Table 4.1 as well as all three Netgear and all
three Linksys devices shown in Table 4.3. Figure 4.7 shows classification performance
for all permutations, where the mean is shown with filled markers.
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Figure 4.7. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingerprints: All
Permutations for Cisco devices transmitting 802.11B signals.
Figure 4.8 shows classification performance using Cisco Perm #1 as well as all
three devices for Linksys and Netgear shown in Table 4.3. As can be seen, the
Cisco and Linksys devices are consistent, while the Netgear has a slight increase in
performance. Since this is intra-manufacturer discrimination, the results indicate that
the Netgear performance is actually poorer compared to the Cisco and Linksys results,
because similar devices should be confused more with each other and performance
degraded.
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Figure 4.8. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingerprints: Three
devices per manufacturer with serial numbers listed in Table 4.3 with devices trans-
mitting 802.11B signals.
4.3.2 802.11B Inter-Manufacturer Performance.
Inter-manufacturer discrimination was performed using permutations in Table 4.3.
Results for three permutation are illustrated in Figure 4.9. Perm #2 and Perm #3
demonstrate consistent results. At 80% classification accuracy, Perm #1 provides a
gain of approximately 3 dB over Perms #2 and Perm #3.
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Figure 4.9. Inter-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingerprints: Per-
mutations from Table 4.3 with devices transmitting 802.11B signals.
4.3.3 802.11B Prop Method Performance.
Work in [1] for DSSS-based 802.15.4 CC2420 devices used a Prop method (dif-
ference in adjacent FFT spectra) that provided the highest recognition accuracy of
99.5%. Figure 4.10 illustrates Perm #2 (top) and Perm #3 (bottom) of the inter-
manufacturer permutations overlayed with their respective Diff method results. As
can be seen, performance is consistent with the standard SD method. The results
for Perm #2 (Figure 4.10 bottom) indicate that the Prop method achieves slight
improvement from SNR = 4 to 15 dB, while the Prop method performance is poorer
(approximately 2-3 dB) using the devices for Perm #3 (Figure 4.10 bottom).
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Figure 4.10. Inter-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingerprints: SD
comparison with Prop using Perms #2 (top) and Perm #3 (bottom) from Table 4.3
with devices transmitting 802.11B signals.
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4.4 SD Performance Comparison: 802.11A/B signals
Figure 4.11 shows a comparison of the SD technique performance for the worst
case Perm #1 of 802.11A compared with Perm #1 of 802.11B, where the devices
in each permutation contain identical serial numbers (Table 4.3 and Table 4.1). As
can be seen, the SD method applied to 802.11B signals provides an improved gain of
approximately 3 dB (although 802.11B preamble lacks the structure of the 802.11A
signals), and there are clearly discriminating characteristics in this region to provide
these classification results.
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Figure 4.11. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingerprints: SD
performance comparison of 802.11A with 802.11B signals for worst case Perm #1.
Figure 4.12 shows mean results taken from Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.7. These
results demonstrate overall improved performance among 802.11B signals at SNR =
30 to -3 dB, and approximately 3 dB gain at 80% classification accuracy.
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Figure 4.12. Intra-Manufacturer MDA/ML Classification using SD fingerprints: SD
performance comparison of 802.11A with 802.11B signals for permutation means taken
from Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.7.
Table 4.4 provides classification confusion matrices for Perm #1 (Table 4.1) of
the Cisco devices for signals at SNR = 14 dB, where the results for 802.11A were
taken from Table 4.2. Classification accuracies for a specific class (device) are pre-
sented along the diagonal, where 802.11B achieves an 88.3% classification accuracy
and 802.11A achieves 83.3% (Figure 4.11). The lower matrix demonstrate perfor-
mance differences between 802.11B and 802.11A. As can be seen, 802.11B provides
improved performance over 802.11A across devices A and C, with the greatest im-
provement of 17.6% achieved for correctly classifying Class A. The lower matrix also
demonstrates some degradation in classifying Class B for 802.11B vs 802.11A.
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Table 4.4. Intra-manufacturer confusion matrices for 802.11A, and 802.11B fingerprint-
ing: Permutation #1 from Table 4.1 with signals at SNR = 14 dB.
802.11A Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 77.9% 5.2% 16.9%
B 6.0% 93.9% 0.1%
C 21.7% 0.3% 78.0%
802.11B Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 95.5% 0.8% 3.7%
B 1.2% 88.9% 9.9%
C 2.9% 16.7% 80.4%
B - A Class Estimate
Input Class A B C
A 17.6% -4.4% -13.2%
B -4.8% -5.0% -9.8%
C -18.2% 13.8% 2.4%
The uniqueness of fingerprint statistical features is illustrated in Figure 4.13.
These RF DNA plots were generated by randomly selecting 200 collected bursts for
each device, scaling them to achieve SNR = 14 dB, and averaging the corresponding
statistical fingerprints. The number of DNA markers per segment is identical for both
802.11A and 802.11B. The y-axis labels correspond to the statistical measures defined
in Section 2.5. The RF fingerprints (Figure 4.13) are from one manufacturer (Cisco)
where the serial numbers are identified on the x-axis. Previous results in this chapter
showed that greater uniqueness translates to better overall classification performance.
When comparing Table 4.4 with Figure 4.13 for 802.11A, it can be seen that Class A
and C are most confused.
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Figure 4.13. Intra-manufacturer RF fingerprint DNA plots showing worst case Perm
#1 of (a) 802.11A and (b) 802.11B fingerprints based on 200 randomly selected bursts
at SNR = 14 dB.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
The increase in availability and reduction in cost of commercial communication
devices (IEEE compliant such as 802.11, 802.15 Bluetooth, 802.16, WiMax, etc) has
increased wireless user exposure and the need for techniques to properly identify sig-
nals for increased security. Fundamental emissions from a device enable it to correctly
operate and may provide unique fingerprints through unintentional modulation due
to alterations caused by hardware and environmental factors. These unique finger-
prints (features) enable the identification of the device manufacturer down to specific
serial number. This research follows previous work [5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17] and
introduces unique Spectral Domain (SD) fingerprinting for classifying 802.11 wireless
devices. This research focuses on proof-of-concept, versus optimization of parameters.
The following provides a summary of results presented in Chapter IV.
5.1.1 802.11A Classification Performance.
Relative to other research [5, 6, 7], SD RF DNA fingerprint classification perfor-
mance is consistent with the WD approach while demonstrating improved classifica-
tion accuracy over the TD approach for 802.11A signals. In most cases, classification
accuracy is greater than 80% at SNR > 5 dB. At 80% classification accuracy, SD
provides a gain of approximately 8 dB over the TD technique and some improvement
(1%-3%) over the WD technique for SNR = -3 to 25 dB (lower SNRs are more con-
sistent with operational environments). Using a spectral differencing Prop method
discussed in [1], some improvement in performance is observed for specific cases, but
generally fails to improve overall classification performance for the majority of per-
mutations completed.
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5.1.2 802.11B Classification Performance.
All parameters used to process 802.11B signals are taken directly from those used
for 802.11A processing. The resulting performance of SD fingerprinting with 802.11B
signals, using the worst case intra-manufacturer permutation, provides a significant
improvement from that of 802.11A. An improved 802.11B gain of approximately 3 dB
is demonstrated over 802.11A classification, which shows that the SD fingerprinting
technique is a viable classification method, providing improved overall classification
performance.
5.2 Recommendations for Further Research
This section provides recommendations for further research on SD RF DNA fin-
gerprinting. Comparing results from previous research using 802.11A signals, SD
fingerprinting provides performance consistent with the WD approach in [5] while
providing less computational challenges. The following provides recommendation for
further research with the SD approach:
1. Bandwidth Sensitivity Analysis: A post-collection filter bandwidth of BW
= 7.7 MHz was used in this research and was chosen to be consistent with
pervious work in [5, 6, 7]. Since the SD method has proven merit, there may
be another bandwidth which provides more benefit and consistency.
2. Specific Waveform Characteristics: This research focuses on using stan-
dard PSD features for SD fingerprints, while previous research used instan-
taneous amplitude, instantaneous phase, and instantaneous frequency for TD
fingerprints [5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17]. Other waveform characteristics may
improve accuracy and make the SD method more robust. Previous work [11, 15]
also used standard deviation along with variance, skewness, and kurtosis. The
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later three statistics were chosen here for consistency with [5, 6, 7] and were not
chosen with any optimality criteria. There may be combinations of statistics
and statistics used over specific subregions that provide greater device/class
separability and improved classification accuracy. The number of regions (NR
= 13) was chosen based on analysis at the collected SNR = 40 dB. Different
NR may be better for other SNR values.
3. Process and Parameter Optimization: The process used for this research
was adopted from [5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17] while not focusing on a single
parameter in the process. From burst detection and processing to signal clas-
sification, many parameters were chosen based on prior work [5, 6, 7] without
focusing on any given factor, parameter, or combinations thereof. Analysis of
specific parameters and combinations thereof may be beneficial.
4. Different Signals of Interest: 802.11A OFDM-based and 802.11B DSSS-
based signals were used here based on work in [1, 5, 15]. Different OFDM
or DSSS signals that are emerging for next generation applications may be
discriminable with SD fingerprinting as well. Additional work could be done
using SD RF fingerprinting with these emerging signals and their appropriate
applications.
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Appendix A. Detailed Signal Collection Procedures
The original collection procedures presented in Appendix A of [15, 11] are pre-
sented in this work for completeness. These collection procedures provide a detailed
process for identifying a signal of interest, collecting its transient signal features,
and converting it to Matlabrusing the Agilent E3238S RFSICS and Vector Signal
Analyzer. The directions below reference screen-shots from the E3238S software for
completeness.
1. Power on the Agilent E3238S RFSICS.
2. Open E3238S application (Figure A.1).
3. Power on the device under test and configure it as necessary.
4. Activate device transmitter and locate its peak in the wide-band search window
(Figure A.2).
5. Zoom in on the signal of interest (right-click and drag to zoom in spectrum
display).
6. Right-click in the left border and select “Tune to Trace” (Figure A.3).
7. Right-click in the left border again, Select “Marker” and Move Radio Button
to “On” (Figure A.4).
8. Move the marker to the current peak of the spectrum display using the icon in
the bottom right of the window (Figure A.5). The marker dictates the collection
center.
9. Right-click in the left border again, Select “Marker to...” and Select “Center
Freq” (Figure A.6).
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10. Now, set the dynamic range of the ADC by going to “Configure”, “Search
Receivers”, “ADC”, “Input Range” and setting it to the lowest value (Figure
A.7).
11. Activate the transmitter and check for ADC overload, if the block in the upper
left corner is red, increase “Input Range” value one step at a time until the
block remains solid blue (Figure A.8).
12. Right-click on grayed out camera in bottom right corner of the main window to
modify the “Snapshot” settings.
13. Change “Status” to “Active”, “Span” to the desired bandwidth, “Duration” to
the desired duration of the collection, “Filename” to the desired, descriptive
filename, click “OK” (Figure A.9).
14. Deactivate the transmitter (if necessary).
15. Click on the now Yellow Camera in bottom right to begin collection.
16. While collection is proceeding, activate the transmitter to collect transient signal
data (Figure A.10).
The collection is then stored as a “Capture” file with the extension “*.cap”.
This file must now be converted to a “*.mat” file for post-collection processing in
MATLABr. The Vector Signal Analyzer software can be used to do this conversion.
1. Open the Vector Signal Analyzer application.
2. Select “File”, “Recall Recording” and choose the desired “Capture” file.
3. Next, select “File”, “Save Recording” and save as “*.mat”.
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The “*.mat” file contains twelve parameters. FreqValidMax and FreqValidMin
are the highest and lowest frequencies of the collection. InputCenter is the center
frequency of the collection. XDelta is the time change between each sample. Inpu-
tRefImped is the input impedance. XUnit and YUnit are the units of measure for
the x- and y-axes of the collection, which are seconds and volts, respectively. Y is
complex signal data of type “single.” InputRange, InputZoom, XDomain and XStart
are additional unused parameters.
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Figure A.1. Initial screen of RFSICS collection
Figure A.2. Wide-band spectral response of the signal of interest.
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Figure A.3. Choose “Tune to Trace” as described in Step 6. Narrow-band view of the
Frequency Content of the Signal of Interest.
Figure A.4. Turn the “Marker” on as described in Step 7.
50
Figure A.5. Set the marker to the peak of the display as described in Step 8.
Figure A.6. Force the current frequency of the marker to the center of the display as
described in Step 9.
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Figure A.7. Set the dynamic range of the ADC as described in Step 10.
Figure A.8. Continue setting the dynamic range of the ADC by checking for overload
as described in Step 11.
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Figure A.9. Configuring the “Snapshot” details as described in Step 13.
Figure A.10. Activate the transmitter while the “Snapshot” is being collected as de-
scribed in Step 16.
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